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NOTES
Jones:
Criminal Immunity in Florida

CRIMINAL IMMUNITY IN FLORIDA
The maxim that no one should be required to betray himself was

regarded at common law as a basic human right, largely because of
the great injustices inflicted upon persons accused of crimes in order
to extort confessions from them. This principle was considered by
our forefathers to be so essential to a democratic government that it
was included in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Most of the states have included it in their state constitutions.
The Florida Constitution provides that "no person shall be .. .com-

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .,,
The existence of the self-incrimination privilege has created a dilemma
because of the conflicting interests of government and of the individual.
On the one hand, in referring to this great privilege, the United
States Supreme Court has said that any other rule "is contrary to the
principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of
an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It
may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."2 On the other
'hand, the assertion of the privilege by an individual often impairs
the ability of both state and federal governments to exercise their
jurisdictions over crime since the privilege often hampers successful
investigations of crime.
A person involved in a criminal venture frequently possesses valuable information that might lead law enforcement officials to the
persons instigating the particular criminal activity. The testimony of
such an individual at a subsequent trial may be necessary to obtain a
conviction of the persons arrested as a result of information supplied
by him. Therefore, agencies of law enforcement, as well as the courts
of Florida, have been given the power to contract with a potential
witness for his testimony or for any documentary evidence of an
incriminatory nature in exchange for immunity from prosecution.
This contract may be created in two ways: first, it may be accomplished through a grant of immunity by a public prosecutor with
the advice and consent of the trial court; secondly, it may be accomplished through operation of statute. The first method is solely
an equitable one, and is best termed an exemption rather than immunity from prosecution. This is more than a semantical distinction
1. FLA. CoNsT. Decl. of Rights §12. Iowa and New Jersey do not have specific constitutional provisions against self-incrimination. However, they each have
an equivalent in statutory form. See IowA, CODE §622.14 (1954); N.J. STAT.
ANx.§2A: 84A-17 (Rule 28) (Supp. Oct. 1962).
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886).
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since the term "exemption" stems from the fact that the guilt of the
defendant is recorded, but the right of the state to impose and to
enforce punishment is affected. The assertion of such a contract
by a defendant creates an estoppel against the state to impose punishment for the crime committed.
EXEMPTION

FROM

PROSECUTION

In Florida, the public prosecutor may, with the consent of the
trial court, contract with a witness for his testimony in exchange for
his immunity from any prosecution. In a leading case, Ingram v.
Prescott,3 the defendant contended he was immune from prosecution
because the State Attorney had used him as a witness against a codefendant. The defendant argued that since he had given testimony
incriminating not only the co-defendant but himself as well, there was
an implied contract for his immunity from prosecution. The court
found no such contract on these facts, but recognized the possibility
that one could have been made. The court stated that "on the
ground of public policy, it has been uniformly held that a state may
contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution if he
shall honestly and fairly make a full disclosure of the crime, whether
the party testified against is convicted or not."4 The court further
declared that such an agreement is not pleadable in bar of an adjudication of guilt, but does affect the right of the court to enforce or
to impose punishment on the defendant. The court reiterated this
principle in Cortes v. State,5 saying that, "the right to immunity from
prosecution is equitable merely, based on the pledged faith of the
public, and does not entitle the accomplice to plead the promise of
immunity as a bar."6 It appears that the practice of Florida courts is
to nolle prosequi and dismiss the prosecution. The reasons for this
are incorporated into the court's judgment, and remain a perpetual
record of the defendant's self-confessed guilt. In this manner the
7
punishment that might be inflicted on the defendant is withheld.
Although this method of obtaining needed evidence is effective, it
still cannot be utilized against an unwilling defendant. His testimony
must be voluntarily given and cannot be compelled in this manner.
However, a defendant who does voluntarily testify must make certain
that the court is a party to the contract; otherwise he may be later
8
subjected to a full prosecution for the crimes disclosed.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

111 Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933).
Id. at 821-22, 149 So. at 369.
135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323 (1938).
Id. at 593, 185 So. at 325.
Ingram v. Prescott, supra note 3.

8. Ibid.
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Whether there can be an agreement between the defendant and
the state for exemption from capital punishment is not entirely clear
in Florida. In the case of Henderson v. State9 the defendant, convicted of murder, charged as error that he was convicted on evidence
obtained from his criminal accomplices under an agreement among
the accomplices, the prosecution, and the trial court, that if the
accomplices testified they would not be subjected to capital punishment. The appellate court found little evidence to support his contention that the immunity extended to him, but did not specifically
rule out the possible validity of such a contract. The court indicated
that authority could be found in the Ingram case to support the validity of such a contract. However, in a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Brown stated, "I do not believe that any court should be a
party to any such agreement, nor do I believe that the case of Ingram
v. Prescott . . . should be construed as sanctioning any such practice."' 0
InMaUrrY BY STATUTE

Cases are relatively few in which necessary evidence is obtained
by a contract for exemption from prosecution; the more common
method of obtaining such evidence is by the compulsion of testimony
under state immunity statutes.'
Florida has enacted a general immunity statute by which a person can be compelled to produce evidence or to testify in an investigation or trial concerning bribery,
burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling, or the illegal sale of liquors,
even though the evidence may tend to incriminate him or subject
him to a penalty or forfeiture. However, the statute further provides
that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence . . . and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him upon any
criminal investigation or proceeding."12
Several problems in the construction of this statute have been
resolved by the Florida courts in light of the function of the legislation. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
the statute is to "aid prosecuting officers in apprehending criminals
9. 135 Fla. 548, 185 So. 625 (1938).
10. Id. at 555, 185 So. at 627-28 (concurring opinion).
11. For a list of immunity statutes in all states and the federal government,
EVIDENCE. §2281 n.11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12. FLA. STAT. §932.29 (1961). Other Florida immunity statutes are: §§55.59,
104.39, 350.60, 366.09, 377.32, 443.12(10), 542.11, 544.05, 568.08, 779.11, 838.08,
849.31, 932.291. The vast amount of case law in Florida regarding immunity
statutes involves §932.29. For this reason only this statute will be considered

see 8 WiGmORE,
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or those engaged in criminal enterprises, by inducing them or their
confederates to turn State's evidence and tell on each other."' 3 Although the courts have stated that the statute is to be liberally
construed in light of this purpose,' 4 the courts at the same time have
refused to extend the statutory coverage to crimes other than those
specifically mentioned in the statute. Thus, murder, 15 criminal communism, 16 and perjury' 7 do not fall within the purview of the statute.
Another problem area has been the delineation of what constitutes
a compulsion to testify. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that
in order for immunity to attach the witness must be compelled to
testify. 18 This compulsion may take the form of a subpoena,' 9 a
promise of immunity,20 a court order, 21 or seizure of private papers
under a search warrant. The last principle is illustrated in the case
of State ex rel. Byer v. Willard.22 The grand jury employed an
investigator to gather information concerning suspected violations of
state gambling laws. Books and records were seized from the defendants offices under a valid search warrant, and were used by the
county solicitor to file an information against the defendant for violations of gambling laws. The Florida Supreme Court granted a writ
of prohibition because the information was based upon evidence
compelled within the meaning of the general immunity statute. The
books and records were taken from a private business office that was
not used in the gambling operations. They were not the type of
records required to be kept by law, nor were they contraband; in
short, the material seized was the private property of the defendant.
The court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination encompasses documents of an incriminating nature that are taken for use
as evidence against the person who lawfully possessed them. This
at length in this note. It should be pointed out that the general considerations

of statutory immunity apply to all the statutes.

13. State ex rel. Raines v. Grayson, 55 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1951).
14. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Newell, 102 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1958).
15. State v. Schroeder, 112 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1959); Johns v. State, 157 Fla.
721, 27 So. 2d 75 (1946).
16. State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1948).
17. Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
18. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
19. In State v. Weissing, 101 So. 2d 433 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), the defendant
appeared before the county solicitor subject to a John Doe witness subpoena. The
court held that had the defendant established that the subject matter of the hearing was one of the crimes in §932.29, then any indictment against him based upon
his testimony would be quashed. The subpoena was sufficient compulsion.
20. Wilson v. State, 134 Fla. 390, 184 So. 31 (1938).
21. Ballengee v. State, 144 So. 2d 68 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
22. 54 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1951).
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case removed much of the doubt as to whether the privilege against
self-incrimination and the general immunity statute were co-extensive.
However, it was left for a later case, State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly,23
to clearly express the rule. Thus, a witness is immunized completely
from prosecution for any crime brought out in his testimony in a
hearing or trial concerning one of the five crimes enumerated in the
statute. This rule also provides immunity for a witness in the event
that the testimony furnishes a link in the chain of evidence required
for the prosecution of the witness. Thus, in one sense the ruling in
the Kelly case extended the interpretation of the immunity statute
to very broad limits, and made it co-extensive with the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the due process clause of
the federal constitution. However, in another sense the Kelly case
purported to limit the immunity statute in order to allay fears that
the statute could serve as a sanctuary by providing immunity for all
the past crimes of a testifying witness. This possibility was eliminated
by the requirement that the testimony be relevant to and have substantial connection with the subject under inquiry in order for
complete immunity from prosecution for any offense revealed to
24
attach.
The general immunity statute affords to those testifying protection
against any penalty or forfeiture based upon the testimony given.
The question how far this immunity extends depends partially on the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of what constitutes a penalty
or forfeiture. This question was to a great extent answered in Florida
State Board of Architecture v. Seymour.2 r Seymour was an architect whose compelled testimony was used by the state to convict
school board officials of bribery. The State Board of Architecture
later instituted proceedings to revoke Seymour's license, on charges
of bribing school officials for a contract to design school buildings.
Seymour contended that he was protected by the general immunity
statute after he testified in the prior trial. The court sustained this
contention, ruling that it is not material whether the penalty or
forfeiture results from a judicial action. The court stated further
20
that:
The terms of the statute must be as broad as the constitutional guaranty [under section 12, Declaration of Bights, Florida
Constitution] and when so construed it would avail the defendant nothing if it did not comprehend a proceeding to revoke his
23. 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
24. Id. at 894.
25. 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952).

26. Id. at 3.
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architect's certificate. A penalty generally has reference to
punishment imposed for any offense against the law. It may
be corporal or pecuniary. A forfeiture is also a penalty and
has to do with the loss of property, position or some other personal right for failure to comply with the law. The right to
earn a living including other personal rights are protected by
the immunity statute.
This includes the loss of an architect's certificate since such rights
are protected by the immunity statute. This protection similarly
extends to the loss of a license to sell alcoholic beverages. Thus, the
court held in Hotel and Restaurant Commission v. Zucker27 that a
state liquor license was a personal or property right and the defendant
was protected by the immunity statute from the penalty of its revocation.
The Zucker and Seymour opinions greatly amplify the interpretation of the general immunity statute. The general immunity statute
not only protects a person from criminal prosecution based upon
testimony given, but extends protection in civil actions instituted by
state agencies as well. In the latter instance, the immunity statute
preserves property and personal rights sought to be disturbed on the
basis of testimony given. As a result, the general immunity statute
is rendered broader than the privilege against self-incrimination because the privilege is normally interpreted as extending protection
solely from criminal prosecutions.
In return for the protection afforded by the general immunity
statute, there is a duty placed upon the witness to testify fully. The
purpose of the immunity statute is to aid criminal investigations by
securing necessary evidence through compulsion. The courts of
Florida have the power to place a witness in contempt if he refuses
to testify after being informed of the immunity statute.2 8 The witness
must be informed of the immunity statute before he can be placed
in contempt. Thus, the court in Ballengee v. State29 reversed a
conviction of contempt because of the failure of the trial court to
inform the defendant of his right to immunity.
PRoBLEMS OF FxDERAsm

The federal system adopted in the United States Constitution has
presented special problems since violations might come under both
federal and state jurisdictions. Thus, any consideration of the
operation of Florida's immunity statute necessarily involves an analy27. 116 So. 2d 642 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
28. Ballengee v. State, supra note 21.
29. Ibid.
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sis of the effect of both the Florida constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. There are two facets
to this problem: whether the state may confer immunity from prosecution in its jurisdiction but require a witness to give testimony
possibly incriminating him in another jurisdiction, and whether the
state may base prosecution on evidence resulting from a federal grant
of immunity. 30 The latter aspect has been considered by the United
States Supreme Court in several significant cases. In Brown v.
Walker3 ' the Court considered the validity of a federal immunity
statute that was challenged because it failed to provide immunity
from state prosecution. The Court ruled that the immunity granted
was general in nature, since protection was extended to any transaction, matter, or thing testified to. However, the Court conceded the
possibility of state prosecution based on the testimony given, but
considered it too remote to invalidate the statute. Thus, the possibility of state prosecution on the basis of compelled information was
not expressly precluded.
In Hale v. Henke 32- the Court dealt further with this problem.
Although the theory of dual sovereignties was advanced, the Court,
considering the important point to be the reality of state prosecution,
took the position that a state prosecution was a remote and insubstantial danger. In effect, therefore, as long as a federal immunity
statute gives complete immunity from federal prosecution, the statute
is valid. It is readily apparent that the court did not prelude the
right of the state to prosecute on federally compelled testimony, but
simply contemplated never having to rule on the question.
The Court's reasoning was carried further in the case of United
States v. Murdock"3 which "definitely settled that one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account of
probable incrimination under state law."3 4 The Murdock case involved
a tax hearing concerning the operation of slot machines. Murdock
was asked to disclose the names of the recipients of $12,000 that he
had deducted from his tax returns, but refused to answer on the
ground that it would tend to incriminate him. When pressed, he
admitted that he feared prosecution under state law. The trial judge
refused to sustain the self-incrimination plea because immunity from
state prosecution was not constitutionally necessary for the validity
30. For a detailed discussion on this problem, see Grant, Federalism and SelfIncrimination, (pts. 1-2) 4-5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549, 1 (1956-1958).

31. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
32. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
33. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
34. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
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of the federal immunity statute. 35 The Supreme Court took the same
view on appeal: 36
The investigation was under federal law in respect of federal
matters. The information sought was appropriate to enable the
Bureau to ascertain whether appellee had in fact made deductible payments in each year as stated in his return, and also
to determine the tax liability of the recipients. Investigations
for federal purposes may not be prevented by matters depending upon state law .... This court has held that immunity
against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused from
giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate him, and
also that the lack of state power to give witnesses protection
against federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity
statute.
The Murdock case and the line of cases leading to that decision were
all based on interpretation of the fifth amendment and its relation to
federal immunity statutes. However, they do point to the fact that
state sovereignty is recognized by the federal courts in criminal
matters. Therefore, the reasoning of these cases is equally applicable
to an interpretation of the relationship between state prosecutions
and federal immunity statutes. The Murdock case clearly recognizes
the right of the state to prosecute upon the basis of federally compelled testimony. This is not absolute since in the proper situation
Congress can provide that immunity granted in a federal hearing
shall also extend to the states. Such was the holding in Adams v.
Maryland.37 This case held that a person -testifying before the Kefauver Committee about the numbers racket was immune from state
prosecution. The defendant was protected by a federal immunity
statute which the Court interpreted as applying to the states. The
Court emphatically stated that Congress has the power to bar state
prosecutions based on evidence given to a congressional body engaged
in a legislative function. When Congress acts within its constitutional
powers, its pronouncements are the supreme law of the land, and as
such are binding upon the state courts. On the basis of this case it
seems that whether a state prosecution can be based upon federally
compelled testimony depends largely upon the federal power being
exercised. Thus, if the power being exercised is solely federal
in nature, there is little doubt that an immunity statute based on that
power can provide state immunity from prosecution.
35. 51 F.2d 889 (S.D. M11.
1930).
36. United States v. Murdock, supra note 33, at 149.
37. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
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Even though it appears from the previous discussion that a state
generally may base a prosecution on federally compelled evidence,
Florida has elected to take a different course of action. The Florida
Supreme Court has given Florida's constitutional privilege against selfincrimination a broad interpretation by refusing to uphold a conviction
based partially upon testimony compelled under the Federal Bankruptcy Act. In the case of Clark v. State,38 the court stated that, "to
permit the introduction of such proferred testimony would be violative
of the provision of Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in our State
Constitution in compelling, indirectly at least, the defendant in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
A similarly broad interpretation on this point was rendered in
Boynton v. State,3 9 in which the Florida court held that the defendant
is immune from prosecution for violation of gambling laws if the
prosecution is based on the fact that the defendant purchased a federal gambling stamp and paid the federal excise tax. Further, the
state may not abate the gambling premises on the basis of the information, as this would constitute a penalty within the meaning of the
general immunity statute. The result of this holding is that, if evidence is compelled under a federal immunity statute, the same degree
of immunity that is provided in Florida's general immunity statute
protects the witness.
The Florida position 'has been codified to cover one specific
40
instance by a statute providing that:
Whenever any witness, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination . . . is instructed by order of any
court of the United States to testify . . . before any federal
grand jury or court of the United States government involving
any interference with . . . the national security . . by
treason . . . the testimony or production of evidence of said
witness shall not be used as evidence in any subsequent
criminal proceedings against him in any court of this state.
Florida has not been so liberal in handling the contention that a
state immunity statute is invalid if it gives no assurance against a
federal prosecution based on testimony given in a state prosecution.
In State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly,4 1 the Florida Supreme Court indicated that there is a danger that refusal to answer on grounds of
self-incrimination may become a subterfuge for failure to answer in
proceedings for the detection or supression of crime. On the other
38.
39.
40.
41.

68 Fla. 433, 436, 67 So. 135, 136 (1914).
75 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1954).
FLA. STAT. §932.291 (1961).
71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
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hand, the court ruled that the grant of immunity cannot be used to
compel testimony that will directly result in a federal prosecution.
Therefore, if the danger of prosecution for a federal offense is substantial and imminent because of disclosures required to be made, the
privilege of self-incrimination will override the immunity statute.
DuE PRocEsS CONSmEATIONS

The position in the Kelly case does not violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Thus, the Court in Jack v. Kansas42 upheld a Kansas court's
contempt citation of the defendant, who had refused to testify because no immunity from federal prosecution was granted, even though
he had received a state grant of immunity. In affirming the con43
viction, the Court stated that:
The state statute could not, of course, prevent a prosecution
of the same party under the United States statute, and it
could not prevent the testimony given by the party in the State
proceeding from being used against the same person in a
Federal court for a violation of the Federal statute, if it could
be imagined that such prosecution would be instituted under
such circumstances.
Legal immunity is considered by the Court to be solely with regard
given it
to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and if that is fully
44
is sufficient to satisfy fourteenth amendment due process.
The prosecution that the Court could not imagine in Jack v. Kansas became very real in the case of Feldman v. United States.45 The
defendant was indicted for mail fraud and the prosecution was based
upon testimony compelled by the State of New York under the state
immunity statute. The lower court ruled that use of this evidence
was not a violation of the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
In affirming this ruling, the Supreme Court also held the New York
statute to be valid.
In the more recent decision of Knapp v. Schweitzer,40 the Supreme Court continued to follow the Jack v. Kansas position. State
contempt proceedings, based upon the defendant's refusal to answer
questions even after immunity was granted, were upheld since no
immunity by the state statute was granted with regard to federal
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

199 U.S. 372 (1905).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 382.
322 U.S. 487 (1944).
357 U.S. 371 (1958).
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prosecution. A state grant of immunity cannot be ruled invalid simply
because such immunity may expose the witness to prosecution under
federal law.4 ' The Court stated that "the Federal Government may
not take advantage of this recognition of the States' autonomy in
order to evade the Bill of Bights. If a federal officer should be a
party to the compulsion of testimony by state agencies, the protection
48
of the Fifth Amendment would come into play."
CONCLIUSON
Knapp v. Schweitzer reflects the existing law on the right of a
state to compel incriminating evidence by a witness under a grant
of immunity, even if there is a possibility of federal prosecution based
on this evidence. In actuality, the Florida position, that if the danger
of prosecution for a federal offense is substantial and imminent because of disclosures to be made, the self-incrimination privilege will
override the immunity statute, is more liberal than is required by the
above case. State courts are not actually required to consider the
imminence of federal prosecutions.
In examining the reasonableness of the Florida position there are
two conflicting policies to consider. On the one hand is the proposition that no man should be subjected to a criminal conviction based
on compelled testimony; on the other hand is the interest of the state
in exercising its criminal jurisdiction to the fullest extent. In protecting the latter interest, a criminal immunity statute is a potent weapon,
aimed more toward the conviction of organizers of crime than toward
the petty criminal doing someone else's bidding. The real problem
is rendering this very valid interest compatible with the basic rights of
the accused; the Florida position successfully reconciles these two
policies. Generally, the substantial danger of a federal prosecution
will be recognizable before a witness is compelled to testify, and therefore a witness is adequately protected under the Florida position. If
a federal officer plays a part in compelling a witness to testify, the
witness is protected from prosecution by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. These principles offer protection
from prosecutions based on state compelled testimony except if a
state compels testimony without federal assistance and then turns the
evidence over to federal officers for prosecution. Thus, the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution should be interpreted
as extending its protection to cover this situation. 49 A construction of
the law in this manner would virtually eliminate the possibility of any
47. Id. at 379.
48. Id. at 380.
49. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), in which the Court held
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federal prosecution based on state compelled testimony and would
abolish the need for removing the state right to use immunity statutes
in exercising criminal jurisdiction. The Florida Supreme Court's
position on state prosecutions using federally compelled testimony is
to be commended. A uniform adoption of this ruling throughout
the United States is very desirable indeed.
DANIEL H.

JoNEs

that evidence unlawfully seized by state officials is precluded from use in a subsequent federal prosecution. Seemingly, the result suggested in the text above
could be reached by similar reasoning.
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